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THE DOCTRINE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY: ALIVE
AND WELL IN VIRGINIA
Michelle ReDavid Rack*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recent years, the doctrine of charitable immunity was be-
lieved by many Virginia practitioners to be an archaic defense lim-
ited to charitable hospitals. This belief likely arose out of the fact
that until 1988 every Supreme Court of Virginia case addressing
the doctrine involved its application to hospitals.1 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, broadened
the doctrine over the years by extending charitable immunity to a
nonprofit college,2 a confederate memorial association,' and an his-
torical church. 4 However, the scope of charitable immunity re-
mained virtually untested in the Supreme Court of Virginia until
the recent cases of J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church,
Thrasher v. Winand6 and Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Americd. In
* Associate, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim & Lollar; B.A., with distinction, 1981, University of
Virginia; J.D., 1985, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See Purcell v. Mary Washington Hosp., 217 Va. 776, 232 S.E.2d 902 (1977); Whitfield
v. Whitaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v.
Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 133 S.E.2d 559 (1963); Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp., 204 Va. 501, 132
S.E.2d 411 (1963); Memorial Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 109 S.E,2d 388 (1959); Danville
Community Hosp. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E.2d 882 (1947); Norfolk Protestant
Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 101 S.E. 785 (1921).
2. Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1929). But see
Radosevic v. Virginia Intermont College, 633 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Va. 1986) (charitable im-
munity denied to educational institution where charter fails to set forth charitable purpose
and where it consistently operated at a profit).
3. Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 629 (1934).
4. Egerton v. R.E. Lee Memorial Church, 273 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 395
F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1968).
5. 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988) (holding that church is eligible for charitable immu-
nity status, but remanding case for new trial on issue of negligent hiring, which operates as
an exception to the charitable immunity of religious institutions).
6. 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699 (1990) (holding that nonprofit civic organization qualifies
for charitable immunity but reversing trial court's finding that plaintiff was beneficiary of
organization's charitable purpose).
7. 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990) (plaintiff boy scout had a cause of action against the
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these cases, the court affirmed that while the elements of the doc-
trine are to be strictly construed, charitable immunity extends to a
broad range of charitable organizations.
II. ELEMENTS OF A "CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION"
The doctrine of charitable immunity, as applied in Virginia com-
mon law, states that beneficiaries of charitable or eleemosynary or-
ganizations cannot bring actions for negligence against such orga-
nizations absent specific allegations of negligence in hiring of
employees." The doctrine arose out of the public policy that a
charity, "founded and fostered . . . through the highest motiva-
tions of public spirit, would be thwarted in its work if laid open to
unrestricted litigation."9
The common law defense of charitable immunity pertaining to
hospitals has been restricted and modified by statute.1" Pursuant
to section 8.01-38 of the Code of Virginia, a hospital is not eligible
for charitable immunity unless the hospital renders exclusively
charitable medical services at no charge, or the party alleging neg-
ligence was accepted as a patient free of charge under an express
written agreement executed by the hospital and delivered at the
time of admission to the patient or the person admitting the
patient.1"
The statute provides further that where a hospital is exempt
from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c), it is not liable for
damage in excess of the limits of its insurance, provided that the
hospital carries insurance coverage in an amount not less than
$500,000 for each occurrence.12
The common law elements of charitable immunity as they per-
tain to charitable organizations other than hospitals remain un-
Boy Scouts of America, a charitable organization, for negligent hiring and retention of a
volunteer scoutmaster who allegedly molested plaintiff).
8. See Purcell v. Mary Washington Hosp., 217 Va. 776, 232 S.E.2d 902 (1977); Whitfield
v. Whitaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v.
Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 133 S.E.2d 559 (1963); Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp., 204 Va. 501, 132
S.E.2d 411 (1963); Memorial Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 109 S.E.2d 388 (1959); Danville
Community Hosp. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E.2d 882 (1947); Norfolk Protestant
Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 101 S.E. 785 (1921).
9. Hill, 204 Va. at 503, 132 S.E.2d 413.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38 (1950 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988).
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changed. To qualify for charitable immunity status, an organiza-
tion has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) it is founded and maintained as a charity, and (2) the
party alleging negligence was a beneficiary of the bounty of, and
not a stranger to, the organization's charitable purposes at the
time of the alleged injury.13
The charitable nature of an organization is determined by the
powers and purposes defined in its charter or articles of incorpora-
tion and the manner in which the organization is conducted. 14 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that the general test for de-
termining charitable status is "whether the organization is main-
tained for gain, profit or advantage.' 1 5 Thus, if the organization is
formed for the purpose of deriving a profit, it is not charitable in
nature. While "charitable purpose" has not been precisely defined
in Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia apparently has adopted
a rather broad definition of the term. Charitable purposes have
been held to include religious purposes, 6 promotion of community
health and welfare,'" promotion of civic welfare,' and relief of pov-
erty."'9 The circuit courts have extended the definition of "charita-
ble purpose" to include educational purposes,20 governmental or
municipal purposes,2' and promotion of social welfare and spiritual
13. See Oakes, 200 Va. at 885, 108 S.E.2d at 392-93; Danville Community Hosp., 186 Va.
at 753, 43 S.E.2d at 884.
14. Id.
15. Danville Community Hosp., 186 Va. at 753, 43 S.E.2d at 884.
16. See J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988); Wes-
ton's Adm'x, 131 Va. at 587, 107 S.E. at 785.
17. See cases cited supra note 1.
18. See Thrasher v. Winand, 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699, (1990); Infant C. v. Boy Scouts
of America, 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990).
19. See Thrasher, 239 Va. at 338, 389 S.E.2d at 699.
20. See Langston v. American Red Cross, 18 Va. Cir. 451 (Virginia Beach 1990) (Red
Cross immune from suit for negligence filed by participant in CPR class who slipped and
fell in a parking lot outside the building where the class was held); Boan v. Peninsula
YMCA, 18 Va. Cir. 145 (Newport News 1989) (YMCA immune from suit for negligence filed
by father of boy who fell from tree during nature study program at YMCA's summer day
camp); see also Morgan v. Marymount Univ., 18 Va. Cir. 428 (Arlington County 1990) (char-
itable immunity defense denied to educational institution whose charter does not indicate
that it is a charity and which consistently makes a profit).
21. See Stayton v. American Legion, 18 Va. Cir. 387 (Henrico County 1990) (plaintiff who
slipped and fell while working as volunteer at carnival sponsored by American Legion fore-
stalled from bringing negligence action against the organization); Straley v. Town of
Urbanna, No. 1763 (Middlesex County Cir. Ct. 1990) (Chamber of Commerce and individual
member of Chamber immune from suit for negligence filed by participant of Urbanna Oys-
ter Festival who was injured when struck by piece of candy thrown during Festival parade);
Philpotts v. City of Norfolk and Norfolk Festevents, Ltd., 18 Va. Cir. 19 (Norfolk 1989)
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Once it is established that the defendant organization is formed
for a charitable purpose, the organization must prove that it oper-
ates in a charitable manner. In making this determination, the su-
preme court has considered the following factors: (1) whether the
officers and directors receive compensation; (2) whether any indi-
vidual, firm or corporation receives any profit from the operation
(3) whether surplus funds are devoted to benevolent and charitable
work, and (4) whether the organization enjoys tax exempt status as
a charitable organization by the state and federal governments. 23
An organization seeking charitable immunity status may generate
revenues as long as it can be shown that the revenues are used to
promote the organization's charitable work.
III. BENEFICIARIES OF THE CHARITABLE PURPOSE: Thrasher v.
Winand
Once an organization establishes that it is formed for charitable
purposes and operates in a charitable manner, the organization
must prove that the plaintiff was a beneficiary of, and not a stran-
ger to, the organization's charitable purpose at the time he or she
allegedly was injured.2 4
Prior to Thrasher v. Winand,25 the circuit courts had established
(nonprofit civic organization immune from suit filed by plaintiff who fell while attending
community event known as Harborfest, sponsored by the organization); Mayne v. City of
Norfolk and Norfolk Festevents, Ltd., No. L87-1242 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. 1989) (same civic or-
ganization immune from suit filed by plaintiff who was assaulted while attending
Harborfest); see also Eldridge v. City of Richmond, 8 Va. Cir. 317 (Richmond 1987) (holding
civic organizations such as Maymont Park Foundation eligible for charitable immunity if
foundation could carry burden of proving that it is entitled to the defense).
22. See, e.g., Boan, 18 Va. Cir. at 145 (YMCA immune from suit for negligence filed by
father of boy who fell from tree during nature study program at YMCA's summer day
camp); Smith v. Peninsula YMCA, 18 Va. Cir. 145 (Newport News 1989) (YMCA granted
charitable immunity defense in suit brought by plaintiff injured while playing basketball on
YMCA premises); Calle v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, No. L89-225 (Norfolk Cir. Ct.
1989) (cheerleader for Catholic elementary school forestalled from bringing negligence ac-
tion against church, school and basketball league).
23. Purcell, 217 Va. at 780, 232 S.E.2d at 904-05; Oakes, 200 Va. at 883-84, 108 S.E.2d at
392.
24. Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 707, 133 S.E.2d 559, 562 (holding that
plaintiff who is not a patient, but an invitee or a stranger having no beneficial relation to the
charitable hospital may recover for tort if negligence is proved); see also Egerton v. R.E. Lee
Memorial Church, 273 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Va. 1967), af'd, 395 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1968);
Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
25. 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
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a trend toward broad construction of the term "beneficiary." For
instance, in Taylor v. American National Red Cross,26 the plaintiff
sustained injuries while donating blood to the Red Cross. The
court held that by donating blood, the plaintiff was a beneficiary of
the charity's bounty, because "as a blood donor [she] was eligible
to so receive any needed blood and blood products as were her
family members. ' 27 Similarly, in Stayton v. American Legion,28
the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell while working as
a volunteer at the defendant's Labor Day carnival. Even though
the plaintiff was a volunteer worker and a paying member of the
organization at the time she was injured, she was held to be a ben-
eficiary of the American Legion's charitable purpose because she
was "free to enjoy all the benefits associated with that Labor Day
function as well as the benefits associated with the American Le-
gion Post generally. '29
In Thrasher,"0 the first non-hospital case in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia addressed the concept of "beneficiary" as it per-
tains to charitable immunity, the court curtailed the trend estab-
lished in the circuit courts by limiting the definition of beneficiary
to those who are deriving a direct benefit from the organization's
charitable purpose at the time the injury occurs. The defendant in
Thrasher was a nonprofit corporation called Mountain Magic, Inc.,
founded for the purpose of sponsoring an annual spring festival,
the proceeds of which were donated to local charities. 1 The plain-
tiff was a member of a social club which operated a food concession
booth at the defendant's festival.32 The plaintiff worked at the
booth all day, was injured in an auto accident while driving home,
and he alleged that the accident occurred because Mountain Magic
failed to maintain proper road closure in the festival area.33 The
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit against Mountain Magic on
two grounds: (1) the plaintiff, as a member of the social club, was
receiving benefit of the organization's charitable activities at the
time he was injured,34 and (2) as a member of the community,
26. 8 Va. Cir. 108 (Norfolk 1984).
27. Id. at 109.
28. 18 Va. Cir. 387 (Henrico County 1989).
29. Id. at 389.
30. Thrasher, 239 Va. at 338, 389 S.E.2d at 699.
31. Id. at 339, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
32. Id. at 339-40, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
33. Id. at 340, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
34. Id. at 340, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
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plaintiff was eligible to receive Mountain Magic's charitable bene-
fits should he need them in the future. 5
Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that "mere membership in a class eligible to receive future bene-
fits, conditioned upon circumstances which might never occur, is
too remote and speculative to be considered." 6 The court added
that "[t]he beneficiaries of Mountain Magic's charity were only
those to whom its board of directors donated the proceeds of its
fund-raising activities, a category to which [the plaintiff] Thrasher
did not belong. '37 Accordingly, the court found that the defense of
charitable immunity could not be asserted against this plaintiff. 8
Thrasher simultaneously broadens and restricts the application
of the doctrine of charitable immunity. While affirming that chari-
table immunity extends beyond hospitals and churches to civic or-
ganizations sponsoring community events, the case also tightened
the reigns on the previously broad interpretation of the concept of
"beneficiary" employed by the circuit courts. After Thrasher, the
soundness of circuit court rulings like Taylor v. American Na-
tional Red Cross and Stayton v. American Legion must be ques-
tioned. While the doctrine of charitable immunity appears to be as
viable as ever in Virginia, future defendants seeking charitable im-
munity will likely be required to prove a direct, tangible relation-
ship between an organization's charitable purpose and the plaintiff
against whom the defense of charitable immunity is asserted.
IV. "NEGLIGENT HIRING" EXCEPTION
Virginia recognizes one exception to the doctrine of charitable
immunity, and that is the independent tort of negligent hiring of
employees. "Negligent hiring" was first discussed in Weston's Ad-
ministratrix v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul,39 a suit filed
against a hospital and nurse employee. In Weston's Administra-
trix, a newborn baby died in the hospital from burns received
when the defendant nurse placed him in a crib with a hot water
bottle which was too hot.40 The court held in that case that the
35. Id. at 341-42, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
36. Id. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701-02.
39. 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
40. Id. at 589, 107 S.E. at 785.
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hospital was a charitable institution and that the only duty it owed
to patients was the exercise of due care in the selection and reten-
tion of employees.41 Since there was no allegation of negligent hir-
ing against the hospital, the suit was dismissed. The court made
similar rulings in several cases involving suits against hospitals.42
In J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church,43 the Supreme
Court of Virginia, for the first time, held that charitable organiza-
tions other than hospitals enjoy immunity from negligence actions.
Further, the court held that churches, like hospitals, must exercise
due care in the hiring of employees."" Victory Tabernacle involved
a negligence action filed by a plaintiff whose ten-year-old daughter
was repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted by an employee of
Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church. The plaintiff alleged that the
church and its pastor knew, or should have known, that the em-
ployee recently had been convicted of aggravated sexual assault of
a young girl, that he was on probation for the offense, and that a
condition of his probation was that he not be involved with chil-
dren.45 Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that the church was neg-
ligent in hiring the employee and entrusting him with duties which
brought him in contact with the plaintiff's daughter.46
The church demurred to the plaintiff's allegations of negligent
hiring, and the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed
the suit.47 The Supreme Court of Virginia, reversing the trial court,
held that negligent hiring operates as an exception to the charita-
ble immunity of religious institutions just as it does with regard to
charitable hospitals.48
In the Victory Tabernacle opinion, the court offered the follow-
ing definition of negligent hiring, adopted from a law review article
quoted in the opinion: "[N]egligent hiring is a doctrine of primary
liability [wherein] the employer is principally liable for negligently
placing an unfit person in an employment situation involving an
41. Id. at 610, 107 S.E. at 793.
42. See Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp., 204 Va. 501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963); Memorial
Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959); Norfolk Protestant Hosp. v. Plunkett,
162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934).
43. 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988).
44. Id. at 210, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
45. Id. at 207, 372 S.E.2d at 392.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 208, 372 S.E.2d at 392.
48. Id. at 209-10, 372 S.E.2d at 393-94.
1990]
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unreasonable risk of harm to others. '49 Since negligent hiring is a
doctrine of primary liability, independent of the employee's ac-
tions, the court reasoned that the church could be liable for negli-
gent hiring even where the employee is charged with a criminal
offense.50 Moreover, the court held that the "negligent hiring" ex-
ception applies even though the employee's alleged offense oc-
curred outside of the scope of his employment.5 1
When the suit was remanded for a new trial on the issue of neg-
ligent hiring, the church contended that the accused rapist was not
a hired employee, but a volunteer.52 Since the wrongdoer was a vol-
unteer worker, the church argued that it could not be liable under
a theory of negligent hiring.53 The jury discounted the church's po-
sition, found that the accused rapist was a hired employee of the
church, and entered a verdict for the plaintiff.54 The case is cur-
rently pending on the church's motion for summary judgment and
new trial. Should this case once again be appealed, the Supreme
Court of Virginia may be asked to determine whether a church can
be held liable for the wrongful acts of a volunteer worker.
The liability of a charitable organization for the acts of its volun-
teers recently was addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
the case of Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America,55 in which a volun-
teer scoutmaster was accused of molesting a twelve-year-old scout.
The plaintiff filed suit against the Boy Scouts of America, alleging
negligent hiring and retention of the scoutmaster. The scoutmaster
previously had been convicted of child molestation in another state
while he was working for the Boy Scouts. 5 6 The Boy Scouts of
America asserted the defense of charitable immunity.5 Citing Vic-
tory Tabernacle, the supreme court found that a charitable organi-
zation is liable to the beneficiaries of the charity for the negligence
of its employees if it fails to exercise ordinary care in selection and
49. Id. at 211, 372 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting Note, Minnesota Developments-Employer Lia-
bility for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v.
K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1303, 1306-07 (1984) (footnotes omitted)).
50. Victory Tabernacle, 236 Va. at 210, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
51. Id. at 210-11, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
52. Johnson v. Victory Tabernacle Church, No. L84-1388 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. 1990).
53. Id.
54. Id. (verdict entered on May 16, 1990).
55. 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990).
56. Id. at 574-75, 391 S.E.2d at 323.
57. Id. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 325.
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retention of those employees.5 8 The fact that the scoutmaster was
a volunteer as opposed to a hired employee did not bear on the
court's ruling.
In broadening the "negligent hiring" exception to include volun-
teer workers, the supreme court, in effect, placed further limita-
tions on the doctrine of charitable immunity as it is applied in Vir-
ginia. Yet, the rulings in Victory Tabernacle and Infant C. v. Boy
Scouts of America also indicate the court's willingness to allow the
use of the charitable immunity defense by all types of charitable
organizations.
V. EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS: CLOAKED WITH CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY?
While it is clear that a charitable organization is immune from a
negligence action arising out of the alleged acts of its employees
(absent allegations of negligent hiring),5" it remains unsettled
whether the individual employee or agent of a charitable organiza-
tion is cloaked with the immunity afforded his principal. There are
no Supreme Court of Virginia cases which address this issue.
In Boan v. Peninsula Y.M.C.A., 0 a ten-year-old boy was injured
when he fell from a tree while participating in a summer camp pro-
gram. When an action for negligent supervision was brought
against the Y.M.C.A. and the individual camp counselors, the suit
was dismissed under the charitable immunity doctrine.6 1 Likewise,
in Straley v. Town of Urbanna,2 the court dismissed a suit for
negligence against both the charitable organization and the indi-
vidual defendant who had been acting as an agent for the organiza-
tion when the alleged tort occurred.
By contrast, in Krupnik v. Glaydin School and Camp, Inc.,63 the
Circuit Court of Loudoun County analogized the doctrine of chari-
table immunity to that of sovereign immunity and concluded that
the individual defendant is not entitled to the charitable immunity
enjoyed by his employer. In reaching the conclusion, the circuit
court relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia cases Crabbe v.
58. Id.
59. See cases cited supra note 1; Thrasher v. Winand, 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
60. 18 Va. Cir. 145 (Newport News 1989).
61. Id. at 149-50.
62. No. 1763 (Middlesex County Cir. Ct. 1990).
63. 3 Va. Cir. 338 (Loudon County 1985).
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School Board14 and Short v. Griffitts.5 In both of those cases, mu-
nicipal employees acting within the scope of their employment
were denied sovereign immunity.66
While drawing analogies among the immunity doctrines is one
option for resolving this issue, it is important to remember that the
various immunity doctrines are established for different reasons.
Charitable immunity is created to promote and foster benevolent
work. This public policy might be severely undermined if benefi-
ciaries of charitable institutions are prevented from filing suit
against the organization itself, but are free to pursue actions
against the individuals who comprise the organization and make
possible its benevolent work.
VI. A NOTE ON PROCEDURE
The defense of charitable immunity is properly raised in the
form of a special plea, as opposed to a demurrer, because the party
seeking charitable immunity is required to prove facts which, in
most cases, are not contained in the pleadings.67 Once raised by
special plea, the elements of the immunity may be established in
an evidentiary hearing.6 Where a special plea of charitable immu-
nity is sustained, dismissal with prejudice is in order.
64. 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968) (overruled by Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 372
S.E.2d 608 (1988)).
65. 220 Va. 53, 255 S.E.2d 419 (1979) (overruled by Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 372
S.E.2d 608 (1988)).
66. In Crabbe, a student was injured while being instructed to use a power table saw in a
class at a county school, and the teacher instructing him was held liable. Crabbe, 209 Va. at
356, 164 S.E.2d at 639. In Short, another employee of a county school was held liable for the
presence of broken glass on an outdoor track when a student was injured after falling on it.
Short, 200 Va. at 53, 255 S.E.2d at 479. Interestingly, athough in both cases the school
employees were held negligent, the school boards enjoyed immunity.
67. See T. Boyn, E. GRAVES & L. MIDDLEDITCH, JR., VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.4
(1982).
68. See, e.g., Thrasher v. Winand, 239 Va. 338, 340, 389 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1990).
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